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Abstract  
We investigate the relationship between family management and innovation investment 
propensity in family firms through analyzing the effect of two innovation impulses: demand-
pull and technology-push. Extending the technology-push/demand-pull framework to the 
context of family firms, and adopting a direct measure of firms’ innovation investment 
propensity, we test our hypotheses on a sample of 1,093 Italian small and medium-sized family 
firms. Our results show that both the demand-pull and technology-push innovation impulses 
moderate the relationship between family management and the firms’ propensity to invest in 
innovation, reducing the negative effect exerted by family management on family firms’ 
innovation investment propensity. Moreover, our evidence shows that family firms’ innovation 
investments are more sensitive to the demand-pull than the technology-push impulse. Overall, 
our findings suggest to practitioners and policymakers that family firm innovation impulses are 
important contingencies that need to be taken into account when making innovation investment 
decisions. 
 
Keywords: Family business, Family firms, Family management, Innovation. 
 
JEL: L20, L26, O32 
 
1. Introduction 
Innovation is an important determinant of sustained firm performance (Blundell, Griffiths, 
& Van Reenen, 1999) and a key driver of technological progress and economic growth (Cohen 
& Levin, 1989; Levin et al., 1987). However, successful innovation processes require financial 
and knowledge resources, accepting a degree of risk ensuing from the difficulty of predicting 
the payoffs of investment projects, and uncertainty over customer acceptance, market and 
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competitive dynamics. Thus, understanding which factors drive (or inhibit) firms’ innovation 
investment decisions has become increasingly relevant in the management literature and a key 
priority in policymakers’ agenda.  
In recent years, technological innovativeness in family firms – the most ubiquitous form of 
business organization in any world economy (La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999) – 
has become a topic of growing interest (Filser, De Massis, Gast, Kraus, & Niemand, 2016). 
There are strong theoretical reasons to expect that the determinants (and effects) of 
technological innovation differ in family and non-family firms (De Massis, Frattini, & 
Lichtenthaler, 2013; De Massis, Frattini, Pizzurno, & Cassia, 2015; Kraus, Pohjola, & 
Koponen, 2012). Existing studies are consistent in highlighting a negative relationship between 
family involvement and technological innovation inputs (R&D investments) (e.g., Chen & 
Hsu, 2009; Block, 2012; Kotlar, De Massis, Frattini, Bianchi, & Fang, 2013; Matzler, Fang, 
Chrisman, & De Massis, 2015; Munari, Oriani, & Sobrero, 2010; Muñoz-Bullon & Sanchez-
Bueno, 2011; Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt, & Webb, 2008).  
This negative relationship is explained by two main theoretical arguments. Based on agency 
theory, it is argued that family firms adopt a conservative financial strategy, with a strong 
preference for internal financial resources (Romano, Tanewski, & Smyrnios, 2001; Sirmon & 
Hitt, 2003) to safeguard family control of the business (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). This 
behavior creates financial constraints that could impede investing in innovation (Carney, 2005). 
Moreover, family firm behavior is distinctively driven by economic and non-economic goals 
(Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012; Kotlar & De Massis, 2013; Randolph, Alexander, 
Debicki, & Zajkowski, 2019). To protect the business for future generations and their 
noneconomic utilities (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 
2007; Kotlar, Signori, De Massis, & Vismara, 2018), family firms tend to be more risk averse 
(Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjöberg, & Wiklund, 2007) and prefer investments that protect the cash flow 
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of the current business (Morck & Yeung, 2003). The pursuit of these goals can lead to 
restrained investments in innovation (Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 2008; Chua, Chrisman, & 
Steiner, 2003; Filser, Brem, Gast, Kraus, & Calabrò, 2018).  
Furthermore, the literature suggests that such behaviors are more likely in family-managed 
firms, since family involvement in management increases the family members’ ability to 
influence the business strategy, reducing non-family members’ discretion to act (Zahra, 2005), 
and strengthening the firm’s focus on pursuing non-economic goals (Block, Miller, Jaskiewicz, 
& Spiegel, 2013). 
Although these arguments have significantly contributed to improving our understanding of 
the innovation behavior of family firms, they provide only a partial explanation of family firms’ 
propensity to invest in innovation activities for at least two reasons. First, prior studies do not 
consider the factors that create the impulse (Brem & Voigt, 2009) to invest in innovative 
activities, that is, whether innovation is demand-pulled (DP) and/or technology-pushed (TP). 
The innovation management literature widely recognizes that DP and TP are the main factors 
influencing the firm’s rate and direction of technological innovation (Di Stefano, Gambardella, 
& Verona, 2012; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1979; Myers & Marquis, 1969; Rosenberg, 1982; 
Schmookler, 1966; von Hippel, 1976). Although the DP-TP approach has been widely used in 
analyzing the innovation behavior of non-family businesses (of different sizes and in different 
industries)1, to our best knowledge, no studies explore the DP and TP innovation sources in the 
context of firms with family involvement.  
The joint consideration of the DP-TP drivers and family involvement could lead to a clearer 
understanding of family firms’ innovation behavior given that DP and TP have very different 
characteristics in terms of degrees of risk, time horizon of expected profits, technological 
uncertainty, level of R&D expenditure, and duration of R&D activities (Herstatt & Lettl, 2004). 
                                                 
1 For a review of the sources of innovation in the TP and DP perspective, see Di Stefano et al. (2012).  
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Moreover, DP and TP are unable in themselves to determine innovation investments in a firm; 
they require the intention and willingness to engage in innovation processes based either on 
technological knowledge or on market demand. Accordingly, we suggest that in family firms, 
the propensity to invest in innovation is the result of the joint action of family management and 
the specific source of innovation considered. This perspective leads us to unveil the 
circumstances under which family management might exert a strong or weak effect on the 
propensity to invest in innovation, helping policymakers select the right actions with the 
potential to stimulate innovation investments in family-managed firms (TP and/or DP policies). 
Second, existing studies generally refer to R&D investments as a proxy of the propensity to 
invest in innovation. Although this is a requirement for creating or improving new products or 
technologies, R&D investments could be a non-exhaustive and underestimated proxy of the 
firm’s propensity to invest in innovation. In fact, innovation investments might also relate to 
other types of expenditure aimed at creating new products or improving processes, and R&D 
expenditure is systematically underestimated in small firms (Archibugi & Pianta, 1996; Patel 
& Pavitt, 1995). In particular, recent literature highlights that “splitting the innovation input 
stage in two parts” (the decision to invest in innovation and the amount of innovation 
investment) avoids a potential interpretation bias of innovation in family firms (Classen, 
Carree, Van Gils, & Peters, 2014, p. 596). For instance, family SMEs have a high propensity 
to invest in innovation despite low R&D intensity (especially compared to non-family firms) 
(Classen et al., 2014).  
Moreover, R&D projects are human-capital intensive (Hall & Lerner, 2010), long term, and 
characterized by high risk and uncertain returns (Holmstrom, 1989). Thus, R&D investments 
would seem more appropriate to reflect investments in technology-pushed rather than market-
pulled innovation. These aspects highlight that the use of a direct measure of the propensity to 
invest in innovation can provide a more exhaustive and precise evaluation of family firms’ 
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innovation behavior in the input stage of the innovation process. 
Based on these considerations, this study attempts to advance our understanding of the effect 
of family management on family firms’ propensity to invest in innovation by integrating the 
technology push/demand-pull framework in the context of family firms, and adopting a direct 
measure of firms’ propensity to invest in innovation. Specifically, we propose a research model 
that explores the moderating effect of demand heterogeneity (as a DP factor) and technological 
capabilities (as a TP factor) in the relationship between the degree of family involvement in 
management and family firms’ propensity to invest in innovation activities. 
Using a sample of 1,093 Italian family firms operating in the manufacturing industries, our 
logistic regression model predicts that DP and TP moderate the relationship between family 
management and firms’ propensity to undertake innovation investments. Specifically, when 
the DP or TP sources of innovation increase, the negative effect of family management – 
measured through family involvement in the top management team (FTMT) – on the propensity 
to invest in innovation weakens. However, our results show that DP is a key contingency of 
investment innovation propensity and a key factor of weakening the negative effect of FTMT. 
Our analysis contributes to the literature on technological innovation in family firms and to 
general innovation management studies in several ways. First, our study provides a more 
comprehensive and fine-grained understanding of the effect of family management on 
innovation investments in family firms. While previous studies mostly analyze its direct effect 
on innovation input or its mediating role in the relationship between innovation input, output, 
and performance (e.g., Diéguez-Soto, Manzaneque, & Rojo-Ramírez, 2016), our research aims 
to clarify the circumstances under which family management might exert a strong or weak 
effect on the propensity to invest in innovation, specifically, whether and how different 
innovation impulses (DP and/or TP) moderate this effect.  
Identifying which factors moderate the relationship between family management and the 
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propensity to invest in innovation would allow a better interpretation of the innovation behavior 
of family firms compared to non-family firms, as well as the heterogeneity among family firms.  
Moreover, in the field of empirical research on innovation in family firms, this is the first 
study to use a direct measure of firm propensity to invest in innovation. As such, it overcomes 
the limitations associated with using R&D intensity in prior research, offering a more accurate 
assessment of the propensity of family firms to invest in innovation.  
Second, our study contributes to bridging the existing knowledge gap at the intersection of 
the innovation management and family firm fields of study (Chrisman, Chua, De Massis, 
Frattini, & Wright, 2015; De Massis et al., 2013; Kotlar, De Massis, Frattini, & Kammerlander, 
2019). The approaches and perspectives developed in the innovation management domain can 
be usefully extended to family firms to better interpret the decisions to invest in innovation 
and, more generally, the mechanisms behind the innovation behavior of these firms.  
In particular, our paper proposes a research model that integrates the push-pull framework 
developed in the innovation management literature in the context of family managed firms to 
better understand which factors drive or inhibit their propensity to invest in innovation.  
Third, in the general field of innovation management, our study offers two main 
contributions. Specifically, in the debate on the juxtaposition between technology and demand 
as sources of innovation and/or their complementary role (Di Stefano et al., 2012), our results 
suggest that in family managed firms, the demand-pull factor appears to be prevalent in 
determining investments in innovation, thus suggesting that the role of the two sources of 
innovation may differ depending on the particular type of firm and its specific characteristics 
(i.e., not only the sector). Moreover, our study contributes to knowledge on the mechanisms 
that enable a firm to leverage different sources of innovation (Di Stefano et al., 2012). Indeed, 
our model shows that in the context of family firms, the DP and TP sources of innovation are 
able to influence the propensity to invest in innovation by reducing the negative effect of family 
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management on firms’ propensity to invest in innovation. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
2.1. Effect of family management on innovation inputs 
Research on innovation in family firms highlights that the distinctive nature of these firms 
influences innovation inputs and outputs (Calabrò et al., 2018; De Massis, Sharma, Chua, & 
Chrisman, 2012; De Massis et al., 2013; Duran, Kammerlander, Van Essen, & Zellweger, 
2016; Roessl, Fink, & Kraus, 2010). These studies are largely consistent in showing that family 
management negatively influences technological innovation inputs (e.g., Block, 2012; Chen & 
Hsu, 2009; Kotlar et al., 2013; Matzler, Veider, Hautz, & Stadler, 2015; Munari et al., 2010; 
Muñoz-Bullon & Sanchez-Bueno, 2011; Sirmon et al., 2008).  
The family’s intention to maintain substantial control over the firm (Carney 2005) and 
pursue non-financial goals (De Massis, Kotlar, Mazzola, Minola, & Sciascia, 2018; Gómez- 
Mejía et al., 2007) are the main reasons that lead respectively to financial constraints (Le 
Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006; Romano et al., 2001) and risk aversion (Naldi et al., 2007), 
which may restrain investments in innovation (Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 2008; Chua et al., 
2003). These effects appear to be more likely when family members are involved in the top 
management team (FTMT). The literature suggests that a higher number of family members in 
the TMT reduces the non-family managers’ discretion and freedom to act (Zahra, 2005). 
Moreover, it increases the firm’s focus on non-economic goals and the tendency to protect the 
family wealth due to having a more direct influence on the firm’s strategy (Block et al., 2013). 
Kraiczy, Hack, and Kellermans (2014) focus on the influence of family involvement in the 
TMT on the firm’s new product portfolio, highlighting that FTMT strongly influences 
investment decisions in innovation.  
Specifically, FTMT may affect its “innovation orientation”, defined as the “senior 
executive’s commitment to, and support for, innovation” (Zahra & Fescina, 1991, p. 16), and 
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“the behavioural intentions of TMT members as a group regarding their willingness to engage 
in innovative activities” (Kraiczy et al., 2014, p. 1066). In other words, the higher the ratio of 
family members involved in the TMT, the more negative the effect of TMT innovation 
orientation on new product portfolio performance, and hence on TMT decisions regarding the 
resources to be invested in each new product (Kraiczy et al., 2014). Following the same 
perspective, we argue that family involvement in the TMT endows family members with higher 
discretion to act. Accordingly, they will be more able to influence the TMT innovation 
orientation concerning investments in innovation activities. 
Family management is likely to strengthen the firm’s focus on pursuing non-economic goals 
(Block et al., 2013). As a result, family managers might take decisions based on protecting and 
preserving the family’s power and authority, even at the cost of losing potential economic 
benefits (Kotlar et al., 2013; Kotlar, Fang, De Massis, & Frattini, 2014b) resulting from 
investments in innovation activities (Matzler et al., 2015). To protect their shareholding voting 
rights and thus their discretion to act, family managers are less willing to share control with 
non-family investors. This behavior may create financial constraints and lead to reduced 
investments in innovation (Carney, 2005), which often require external funding (Duran et al., 
2016). Moreover, the literature suggests that family-managed firms invest less intensively in 
innovation than non-family managed firms (Classen et al., 2014), perhaps because family 
managers increase the firm’s risk aversion to protect the family wealth (Zahra, 2005).  
Indeed, a higher presence of family members in the TMT leads to greater overlap between 
ownership and management, and thus the closer identification of the family wealth with the 
firm’s assets. This in turn reduces the propensity of family firms to invest in innovation 
(Sciascia, Nordqvist, Mazzola, & De Massis, 2015). Moreover, a high degree of family 
management is acknowledged to generate more risk aversion when making decisions, 
especially when the payoffs of the innovation investments will manifest in the long run and are 
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more difficult to predict (Sorescu, Chandy, & Prabhu, 2003). 
These arguments are consistent with recent empirical studies showing that family 
management negatively influences innovation inputs. For example, Matzler et al. (2015), in 
their recent study of large German publicly traded firms, find that family management has a 
negative effect on innovation inputs, suggesting that family members are risk-averse and 
reluctant to invest in innovation. Chrisman & Patel (2012), in their study on publicly-held 
manufacturing firms, highlight that compared to non-family firms, family firms (defined based 
on ownership and family involvement in governance and management) tend to invest less in 
R&D due to owners and managers seeking to avoid perceived threats to their socioemotional 
wealth. Therefore, based on this literature, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H1. There is a negative association between family management and family firms’ 
propensity to invest in innovation. 
 
2.2. The demand-pull and technology-push perspectives 
Recent empirical studies in innovation management highlight the relevance of combining 
the demand-pull (DP) and the technology-push (TP) perspectives into a unified framework to 
analyze the innovation behavior of firms (e.g., Crépon, Duguet, & Mairesse, 1998; Dosi & 
Nelson, 2013; García-Quevedo, Pellegrino, & Vivarelli, 2014). These two opposing 
perspectives are largely used to explain the sources that influence the firm’s rate and direction 
of innovation (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1979; Myers & Marquis, 1969; von Hippel, 1976; 
Rosenberg, 1982; Schmookler, 1966). However, Di Stefano et al.’s (2012) recent literature 
review advocates their equal consideration. 
Distinctively, the DP perspective identifies market and consumer needs as the main sources 
of innovation driven by the firm’s recognition and intention to satisfy these needs (Mowery & 
Rosenberg, 1979; Scherer, 1982; Schmookler, 1966). Factors such as demand heterogeneity 
(Adner & Levinthal, 2001; von Hippel, 2005), consumers in different geographic markets (Piva 
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& Vivarelli, 2007; Priem, Li, & Carr, 2012; Xie & Li, 2015), or potential new markets (Vernon, 
1966) are demand-pulled impulses that may create opportunities for firms to invest in 
innovation activities.  
On the other hand, the TP perspective proposes that research activities aimed at developing 
new technology and its commercialization drive innovation (Mowery & Rosenberg 1979; 
Rosenberg, 1974; Scherer, 1965). Specifically, “the stimulus for new products and processes 
comes from (internal or external) research; the goal is to make commercial use of new know-
how […]. Therefore, it does not matter if a certain demand already exists or not” (Brem & 
Voigt, 2009, p. 355). The rate and direction of innovation are determined by advances in 
science and technology and the availability of exploitable “technological opportunities” 
(Rosenberg, 1974). In particular, this perspective highlights the crucial role of a firm’s 
technological capabilities (i.e., the firm’s physical and knowledge capital stock) to develop 
new products and processes, emphasizing that, “to build up such a capital stock, inputs like 
R&D investment or further education of the employees are necessary” (Horbach, 2008, p. 164). 
In more recent studies, an extension of this idea is that a key determinant of innovation is the 
cumulative knowledge invested to develop the firm’s “absorptive capacity” (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002) and exploit emerging opportunities (García-Quevedo 
et al., 2014; Nemet, 2009). 
This framework appears to be suitable and especially useful for analyzing the propensity of 
family owned-managed firms to invest in innovation for several reasons. The DP and TP 
innovation impulses imply very different levels of risk and intensity of resource investments 
(as we discuss in detail in the following section). The literature on innovation behavior in 
family owned-managed firms considers the firm’s resource endowment and the level of risk 
related to decisions to innovate as fundamental factors that influences this behavior (e.g., Nieto, 
Santamaria, & Fernandez, 2015). Specifically, the distinction between market-pull (DP) and 
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technology-push driven innovation (TP) is an important criterion for interpreting “how” family 
firms approach innovation (e.g., Nieto et al., 2015; De Massis et al., 2015). 
This distinction implies that family owned-managed firms approach innovation decisions 
following paths that correspond with their risk preferences and their financial and managerial 
endowment (e.g., Nieto et al., 2015). The recent empirical study of De Massis et al. (2015) on 
product innovation in family owned-managed firms suggests that the average budget per 
innovation project is determined by jointly considering market-pull (DP) and technology-push 
(TP) driven innovation as well as the family goals and preferences. Therefore, these two 
innovation impulses may play a key role in determining the family management’s influence on 
the firm’s propensity to invest in innovation.  
In the following, we consider these two different perspectives to develop our hypotheses on 
family firms’ propensity to invest in innovation. Fig.1 illustrates our proposed research model. 
(Insert Fig. 1 about here) 
 
2.3. The DP and TP effects on family firm innovation investment propensity 
The literature highlights that the DP and TP perspectives refer to two different innovation 
impulses (Brem and Voigt, 2009) with substantially different characteristics (Herstatt & Lettl, 
2004) (see Table 1). 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
 
These differences lead to considering that the DP and TP innovation impulses may variously 
affect firms’ propensity to invest in innovation, as we explain in the following. 
Demand-pulled innovation investments are undertaken on “some reasonable expectation 
that there exists a market demand sufficiently large to justify that expenditure” (Mowery & 
Rosenberg, 1979, p. 141), and therefore on the positive expectation of sales and profitability 
(Fontana & Guerzoni, 2008). Therefore, the DP innovation impulse is characterized by low 
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levels of sales/market-related uncertainty (Herstatt & Lettl, 2004). Consequently, the timing 
and cash flows are easy to predict and more stable compared to technology-pushed innovation 
investments.  
These characteristics may positively influence family firms’ propensity to invest in 
innovation, as they are consistent with their “peculiar financial logic” (Gallo, Tapies, & 
Cappunis, 2004, p. 315). In fact, family firms have a strong preference for internal over external 
financial resources (Romano et al., 2001; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) to safeguard family control of 
the business (Croci, Doukas, & Gonec, 2011; González, Guzmán, Pombo, & Trujillo, 2013; 
Mahérault 2004; Romano et al., 2001; Wu, Chua, & Chrisman, 2007), and protect the family’s 
socioemotional wealth (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). As a result, family firms are strongly 
dependent on internally generated funds (De Massis, Audretsch, Uhlaner, & Kammerlander, 
2018; Poutziouris, 2001) linked to operating cash flow and profitability. Thus, DP investments 
in innovation can be seen as a way of generating and ensuring stable and low-risk resource 
flows (compared to technology-pushed innovation), consistently with the family firm’s 
preference for self-financing.  
Moreover, the DP innovation impulse can stimulate a family firm’s propensity to invest in 
innovation, as it implies low levels of R&D expenditure (compared to technology-pushed 
innovation) (see Table 1). High R&D investments generally require resorting to outside 
financial resources (Duran et al., 2016), but family firms are reluctant to raise money 
externally, preferring investments that protect the cash flow of the current business (Mork & 
Yeung, 2003), despite potentially forgoing growth opportunities (González et al., 2013; 
Mahérault, 2004; Wu et al., 2007). This financial behavior may create financial constraints that 
could lead to limited investments in innovation (Duran et al., 2016; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007) 
if the resources needed are higher than the firm’s financial capacity. Instead, DP innovation 
implies low levels of R&D expenditure, and may thus positively influence the family firm’s 
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propensity to invest in innovation. Formally stated: 
H2. There is a positive association between the demand-pulled innovation impulse and 
family firms’ propensity to invest in innovation. 
 
On the other hand, technology-pushed innovation activities are not based on potential or 
existing market demand, and thus characterized by higher levels of sales/market-related 
uncertainty (compared to demand-pulled innovation) (see Table 1), making the timing and 
returns less easily predictable. Moreover, the literature highlights that technology-pushed 
innovation is also characterized by higher technological and time-to-market uncertainty, high 
R&D expenditure, and the longer duration of R&D activities (see Table 1).  
All these aspects may exert a negative influence on family firms’ innovation propensity for 
two main reasons. First, family firms are generally reluctant to invest significant resources in 
innovation, preferring less risky and less uncertain investments (Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 
2012; Duran et al., 2016). Second, differently from demand-pulled innovation, the uncertainty 
of sales and profitability generated by technology-pushed innovation investments is less 
consistent with the family firm’s financial logic based on the strong preference for self-
financing.  
Moreover, the TP perspective highlights the firm’s knowledge capital stock and its ability 
to develop absorptive capacity as key aspects of the innovation process (Nemet, 2009; 
Rosenberg, 1990). The firm’s knowledge capital stock is strongly related to the human capital 
it can access (Horbach, 2008), yet family firms are characterized by a lack of qualified human 
capital and the difficulty of attracting it (Blanco-Mazagatos, de Quevedo-Puente, & Delgado-
García, 2018; Carney, 1998; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). Indeed, family firms need to 
open their management to non-family members to acquire knowledge that family members do 
not possess (De Massis et al., 2015, De Massis, Kotlar, Frattini, Chrisman, & Nordqvist, 
2016b), but the family firm’s human resources management practices (such as favoritism 
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toward family members and the perception of differences in treatment and monitoring between 
family and non-family members) (e.g., Madison, Daspit, Turner, & Kellermanns, 2018) reduce 
the incentive for non-family members to invest in firm-specific knowledge (De Massis et al., 
2015, 2016b) and to permanently join the firm (Colombo, De Massis, Piva, Rossi‐Lamastra, & 
Wright, 2014; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003).  
These aspects can hamper the family firm’s knowledge accumulation process as well as its 
absorptive capacity (Classen, Van Gils, Bammens, & Carree, 2012). Consequently, in family 
firms, the TP innovation impulse may have negative effect on the propensity to invest in 
innovation. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3. There is a negative association between the technology-pushed innovation impulse and 
family firms’ propensity to invest in innovation. 
 
While most prior research on family firms focuses on a direct effect of family management 
on innovation inputs, we now hypothesize that innovation investment propensity is the result 
of the joint action of family management and the specific innovation impulse. Accordingly, 
below we propose the DP and TP innovation impulses as potential moderators in the 
relationship between family management and the firm’s innovation propensity. 
Demand-pulled innovation requires a low level of R&D expenditure, and hence low 
uncertainty about its success and future returns, thus reducing the need for external financial 
resources. These characteristics determine low-risk investments in innovation and are likely to 
reduce the family management’s reluctance to invest in innovation. Indeed, family managers 
are risk-averse in their investment decisions due to their fear of losing shareholding rights to 
non-family investors and their discretion to act. Moreover, family managers are reluctant to 
take excessive risks in order to protect their socioemotional wealth (Zahra, 2005). As a result, 
the DP innovation impulse should positively influence the relationship between family 
management and innovation propensity. 
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Furthermore, the DP innovation impulse is typically related to incremental innovation 
strategies (Brem & Voigt, 2009; Darroch & McNoughton, 2002; Hersatt & Lettl, 2004). The 
literature suggests that family management influences the firm’s strategy by strengthening the 
focus on family-centered goals (Chrisman, Chua, De Massis, Minola, & Vismara, 2016) and 
preserving the family’s socioemotional wealth (Gómez-Mejia et al., 2007), which ultimately 
results in conservative strategies and short-term innovation projects related to incremental 
innovation (Li & Daspit, 2016). Therefore, we argue that the DP innovation impulse should 
determine a less pronounced negative effect of family management on a firm’s innovation 
propensity. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H4. The demand-pulled innovation impulse moderates the relationship between family 
management and the family firm’s propensity to invest in innovation. Specifically, an 
increase in the DP innovation impulse will lead to a weaker negative effect of family 
management on family firms’ propensity to invest in innovation. 
 
On the other hand, the TP innovation impulse can strengthen the negative relationship 
between family management and innovation investment propensity for a number of reasons. 
The TP impulse implies investments in innovation characterized by high uncertainty, high risk 
in terms of their success and returns, and a high level of R&D expenditure, which can generate 
new knowledge and enhance the firm’s ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit existing 
knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990) (see Table 1). The literature suggests that in 
family owned-managed firms, the level of risk associated with the investment decision and the 
amount of resources available are the main factors that “make family involvement an influential 
characteristic in innovation processes” (Nieto et al., 2015, p. 382).  
Consequently, the TP innovation impulse can lead family management to greater risk 
aversion regarding investment decisions, and lower willingness to invest in innovation. Indeed, 
in family-managed firms, the uncertainty and risk related to these investments may expose the 
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family assets due to the close overlap of the family members’ and the firm’s wealth. Moreover, 
high R&D expenditure often calls for external resources, yet the family management is 
typically reluctant to share (or lose) decision-making control, and thus not inclined to access 
external capital or allow the entry of non-family investors (Diéguez-Soto et al., 2016).  
Furthermore, the financing of high R&D expenditure can generate high financial costs due 
to information asymmetry (the debt holders do not know the real value of the technology 
investment) and the intangible nature of the asset created by these investments (that cannot 
serve as collateral) (Hall, 2002). Finally, TP innovation refers to radical innovation strategies 
(Brem and Voigt, 2009; Darroch & McNoughton, 2002; Hersatt & Lettl, 2004), implying 
exploration-oriented activities characterized by risk-taking, research, experimentation, and the 
need for new external resources and skills for their integration with existing resources. These 
activities may lead to a reconfiguration of the firm’s resources and power system, and thus the 
family managers’ perception of the risk of uncertain effects on their socioemotional wealth 
(Carnes & Ireland, 2013). Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H5. The technology-pushed innovation impulse moderates the relationship between family 
management and the family firm’s propensity to invest in innovation. Specifically, an 
increase in the TP innovation impulse will lead to a stronger negative effect of family 




The data for this research was gathered from the EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit Dataset 
(EFIGE Dataset) collected within the EFIGE project (European Firms in a Global Economy: 
Internal policies for external competitiveness) supported by the European Commission through 
its 7th Framework Program. The EFIGE Dataset contains qualitative and quantitative 
information on 14,759 manufacturing firms with more than nine employees in seven European 
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countries. The data cover about 150 items related to R&D and innovation, ownership, labor 
organization, financing, internationalization, and pricing policy. The data were collected in 
2010 through a survey covering the years 2007 to 2009. The first version of this dataset, relating 
to the period 2001–2003 (using the same questionnaire survey but focusing only on Italian 
companies), has been used in previous innovation management studies (e.g., Laursen, 
Masciarelli, & Prencipe, 2012; Laursen, Masciarelli, & Reichstein, 2016).  
Our research focuses on all Italian small and medium-sized family firms (family SMEs) 
included in the EFIGE Dataset (except those with outliers or missing data regarding the 
variables of interest as described below). The criteria adopted to ensure the standard statistical 
representativeness of our sample and all the data included in the EFIGE Dataset are illustrated 
in detail in the descriptive document attached to the dataset and edited by Altomonte and 
Aquilante (2012). We referred to Italian family SMEs for three main reasons: family 
involvement is likely to be more prominent and relevant in influencing behaviors in smaller 
firms compared to larger firms (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2012); family SMEs have a relevant 
impact on economic growth (Audretsch, Keilbach, & Lehmann, 2006; Memili et al., 2015); 
and the Italian industrial system is characterized by the prevalence of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) (99.9% of total firms) (European Commission, 2017).  
Italy is a particularly interesting context for studying firms’ propensity to invest in 
innovation. In fact, Italian firms are characterized by levels of investments in innovation below 
the average of other European countries (CNR, 2018), and Italy ranks among the European 
countries defined as “moderate innovators” (European Commission, 2019). We adopted the 
European Commission’s definition of SMEs, and therefore selected enterprises with fewer than 
250 employees and an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million euro.  
To identify the family firms, we used the following two criteria: the firm is directly or 
indirectly controlled by an individual or family-owned entity; the number (more than one) of 
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entrepreneurs/executives (including middle management) related to the family that owns the 
firm. Although our focus is on family management, we also consider the family ownership 
criterion to take into account that an SME can typically be qualified as a family business if the 
family holds the majority of shares (Gómez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011), in 
accordance with previous studies on innovation investment decisions in family SMEs (e.g., 
Classen et al., 2014).  
Moreover, family involvement in both ownership and management is consistent with prior 
studies aiming to capture the effect of family involvement on decision-making (e.g., De Massis 
et al., 2012; Kotlar, De Massis, Fang, & Frattini, 2014a). We excluded all firms whose data 
were not available for all the variables and the period of interest. In addition, we removed the 
outliers using the z-scores method (re-centering and rescaling the data, and considering the +3 
and -3 thresholds). After considering all companies in the EFIGE Dataset and respecting the 
above criteria, we obtained a final sample of 1,093 Italian family SMEs. 
 
3.2. Variables 
Dependent variable. Similarly to prior research measuring family SMEs’ propensity to 
invest in innovation as a dummy variable (if or if not the firm reports positive innovation 
expenditure in the observed year) (e.g., Classen et al., 2014), we assessed innovation 
investment propensity adopting a binary variable (INN_PRO) equal to 1 if in 2009 the firm 
decided “not to postpone investments in product or process innovation”, taking the value 0 
otherwise, and referring to time t + 1 (2009) with respect to the independent variables. 
Independent variables. We assessed family involvement in the top management team 
(FTMT) using a continuous variable expressed as a percentage, and obtained by dividing the 
number of family members involved in the TMT by the total number of TMT members in 2008 
(Minichilli, Corbetta, & MacMillan, 2010). To capture the demand-pull innovation impulse, 
we referred to demand heterogeneity (consumer needs or market segments). This is consistent 
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with the demand pull perspective emphasizing the importance of consumer (market) 
heterogeneity as drivers of innovation (e.g., Adner, 2002; Adner & Levintal, 2001; Priem et 
al., 2012; von Hippel, 2005).  
Indeed, demand heterogeneity allows acquiring knowledge from different geographic areas 
promoting new combinations of knowledge that can lead to more innovation (Xie & Li 2015; 
Singh, 2008). Following prior research in the demand pull perspective using a firm’s 
heterogeneous geographic markets as a proxy of demand heterogeneity (e.g., Xie & Li, 2015; 
Piva & Vivarelli, 2007), we assessed this variable by measuring the total number of countries 
to which a firm exported its products in 2008 (DEM_HETER).  
To capture the technology push innovation impulse, we referred to firm technological 
capabilities. This is consistent with the technology push perspective emphasizing the 
importance of such capabilities (e.g., Baumol, 2002; Rosenberg, 1974), and consisting of the 
firm’s physical and knowledge capital stock (Horbach, 2008) as drivers of innovation.  
Specifically, following prior research underlining employee education as a way to build 
such capital stock, and arguing that “high qualification of employees” (measured as the share 
of highly qualified employees) is “interpretable as indicator of technological capabilities” 
(Horbach, 2008, p. 167), we assessed technology-push innovation impulse as the percentage of 
university graduates in the firms’ workforce in 2008 (HIGH_QUAL). 
Control variable. Prior literature has highlighted the relevance of firm age (AGE) as a 
predictor of entrepreneurial behavior (De Massis, Chirico, Kotlar, & Naldi, 2014) and its 
influence on innovation performance (Craig & Moores, 2006). AGE was measured as the 
number of years the firm has been established (Lee & O’Neill, 2003) using three classes: less 
than 6 years; from 6 to 20 years; over 20 years. Firm size (EMPL) can influence innovation 
decision-making (Damanpour, 2010; Shefer & Frenkel, 2005; Vaona & Pianta, 2008), and was 
measured using total number of employees. Since business sectors are characterized by 
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different degrees of technological opportunity, R&D intensity, and innovation (Pavitt, 1984), 
we considering four subsectors: traditional, high tech, specialized, and economies of scale 
(Pavitt, 1984) (codified from 1 to 4 according to the above ordering). Given that the chief 
executive officer’s age may influence strategic decision-making (Barker & Mueller, 2002; 
Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), we controlled for the CEO age effect (CEO_AGE) (Barker & 
Mueller, 2002) using an ordinal variable coded in seven year classes.  
Moreover, in family firms, the CEO may be a family member who typically has personal 
wealth invested in the firm and pursues non-financial goals (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004). 
Thus, we controlled for the family CEO effect using a binary variable (FAM_CEO) equal to 1 
if the CEO is a member of the controlling family, 0 otherwise. Finally, we considered that 
public policy and regulations can facilitate or inhibit a firm’s investment in innovation through 
financial incentives (Herrera & Sánchez-González, 2013), and hence included a binary variable 
(PUB) equal to 1 if the firm benefited from public sector financial incentives, 0 otherwise. 
 
3.3. Model  
To study the relationship between the set of independent variables and the dependent 
variable INN_PRO, we used logistic regression models (Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Table 4). 
Model 1 only includes the control variables, Model 2 includes FTMT, Model 3 includes 
DEM_HETER and HIGH_QUAL, Model 4 includes the interaction terms between 
DEM_HETER and FTMT, and HIGH_QUAL and FTMT. 
Model 4 (the full model) is given by: 
 
 
where the four PAVITT categories of the SECTOR variable are represented using three 
dummy variables (SECTOR2, SECTOR3, and SECTOR4), and the three AGE modalities are 
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represented with two dummy variables (AGE2 and AGE3).  
 
4. Results 
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. To highlight 
some summary statistics of the dichotomous variables INN_PRO, PUB, and FAM_CEO, we 
inserted their percentages in the mean column of Table 2. We observe that 45% of Italian family 
SMEs postponed investments in innovation. Moreover, 16% benefitted from public financial 
incentives. The average number of employees is 32.32 with the S.D. equal to 23.51. Moreover, 
our data show that 6% of the sample is composed of young firms (less than 6 years), 32% are 
6–20 years old, and 62% are more than 20 years old. Considering the four subsectors 
(traditional, high tech, specialized, and economies of scale), the percentage distribution is 
respectively: 54%, 17%, 24%, and 5%. The average percentage of FTMT is equal to 84.84% 
with the S.D. equal to 24.23. We highlight a negative significant correlation between INN_PRO 
and FTMT (-0.27). In addition, the other variables are significantly correlated with INN_PRO, 
and except for FAM_CEO, present a positive relationship. Table 4 shows the logistic regression 
models. 
(Insert Tables 2, 3, and 4 about here) 
 
The control variables are introduced in Model 1. We found a significant positive effect of 
AGE and the economies of scale subsector on INN_PRO, and a positive effect of CEO_AGE 
and EMPL. Instead, there is a statistically significant negative effect of FAM_CEO on 
INN_PRO. In Model 2, we introduced FTMT, which has a statistically negative effect on 
INN_PRO. In Model 3, the variables DEM_HETER and HIGH_QUAL were included. In terms 
of the direct effect of these variables on INN_PRO, we underline that only the former has a 
statistically significant positive effect on INN_PRO. In Model 4, we introduced the interaction 
terms DEM_HETER with FTMT, and HIGH_QUAL with FTMT. To better interpret the effect 
of DP on investment propensity, we observe that this effect becomes negative in the regression 
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model that also considers the moderation effects (Model 4). Although the difference in value 
between the two coefficients of Models 3 and 4 is very low, this result would seem to suggest 
that the influence of the variable DP in family managed firms must be carefully considered, 
and therefore further investigated in future research on innovation in family SMEs.  
Both interaction effects are positive and statistically significant in influencing INN_PRO. 
These two interaction effects have a similar interpretation, i.e., FTMT always has a negative 
effect on INN_PRO, but this negative effect is moderated by HIGH_QUAL and 
DEM_HETER. These moderating effects are such that for low levels of HIGH_QUAL or for 
low levels of DEM_HETER, the negative effect of FTMT on INN_PRO is much more 
pronounced if compared to when these two variables assume high values. Clearly, when 
HIGH_QUAL and DEM_HETER are high, the negative effect of FTMT on INN_PRO is 
dampened and remains negative (see Fig. 2). 
 
(Insert Fig. 2 about here) 
 
 
Model 4 shows a significant negative effect of DEM_HETER, which is naturally offset by 
the high significance of the interaction effect between DEM_HETER and FTMT that is 
opposite to and more significant than the direct negative effect of DEM_HETER on INN_PRO. 
Concerning the significance of Model 4, this explains approximately 10% of the variability of 
the phenomenon. Our findings suggest that the effect of FTMT on INN_PRO is statistically 
significant (see Table 4), confirming H1.  
Furthermore, we find a positive association between the demand-pulled innovation impulse 
and propensity to invest in innovation, confirming H2. In fact, Model 3 (Table 4) shows that 
the direct effect of DEM_HETER on INN_PRO is positive and statistically significant. Our 
results lead us to reject H3, as the regression coefficients of HIGH_QUAL, although positive, 
are not statistically significant. Conversely, we can confirm H4 given that the coefficients of 
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the interaction term between DEM_HETER and FTMT are positive and statistically 
significant. Specifically, DEM_HETER has a moderating effect in the relationship between 
FTMT and INN_PRO: the higher the DEM_HETER, the weaker the negative effect of FTMT 
on INN_PRO. Concerning H5, this hypothesis must be rejected, as our results provide opposite 
evidence. Indeed, although the regression coefficients of the interaction terms between 
HIGH_QUAL and FTMT are positive and statistically significant, and thus HIGH_QUAL has 
a moderation effect, this effect is opposite to our hypothesis. Hence, as HIGH_QUAL 
increases, the negative effect of FTMT on INN_PRO decreases. 
 
4.1. Robustness check 
A fundamental challenge in empirical research, particularly in cross-sectional studies, is 
limiting the endogeneity issue, which is mainly caused by omitted variables and simultaneity. 
To alleviate the endogeneity concerns, we reduced the possible impact of reverse causality 
by adopting a dependent variable taken at time t+1, whereas the independent variables are 
captured at time t. Moreover, since DEM_HETER and HIGH_QUAL may be endogenous in 
our models, we refer to two-stage least squares (2SLS) with multiple instrumental variables 
(IV). We performed the analysis using the R package AER with the function “ivreg”. We used 
instrumental variables to compute the estimated values of the problematic predictors 
(DEM_HETER and HIGH_QUAL) in the first stage, and then used those computed values to 
estimate a regression model of the dependent variable (INN_PRO) in the second stage.  
We identified the following set of IVs that met these requirements: CEO gender, as female 
CEOs are more likely to internationalize via export (Pergelova, Angulo-Ruiz, & Yordanova, 
2018) (determining more heterogeneity in consumer demand) and appear to be more qualified 
than their male counterparts (Donovan, 2015); the presence of benefits or bonuses for 
managers, as it represents a mechanism for retaining employees with high skills and 
qualifications, and some forms of compensation include training and educational development 
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opportunities; export activities before 2008, since it may even take two or three years to transfer 
the knowledge inputs from foreign markets into product innovation (Salomon, 2006); possible 
affiliates in Italy or abroad, as affiliates in different geographic locations implies considering 
different markets and consumers (Singh, 2008), and therefore greater demand heterogeneity. 
Finally, we consider the existence of foreign competitors, which requires adopting a broader 
market perspective, and the greater geographic heterogeneity of possible consumers to achieve 
competitive innovations with a global application. All these were measured as dummy 
variables. 
 The findings of the 2SLS-IVs approach suggest accepting the null hypothesis that our 
model is equal to the 2SLS-IV, and thus that endogeneity is not a concern in our study. In fact, 
the instruments are not weak (p-values lower than 0.05), with the Wu-Hausman test p-value 
equal to 0.283, and the Sargan p-value equal to 0.613, confirming that all the instruments are 
significant.  
Furthermore, to check the robustness of our model, we also tested the three-interaction 
effects among FTMT, HIGH_QUAL, and DEM_HETER (Fig. 3). However, this interaction 
term was not included in our regression models, and we investigated this specific relationship 
for exploratory purposes only. The interaction term considers the combined effect of 
DEM_HETER and HIGH_QUAL in moderating the negative effect of FTMT on INN_PRO. 
Specifically, the negative effect of FTMT on INN_PRO is particularly strong if both 
DEM_HETER and HIGH_QUAL assume very low values. On the other hand, this negative 
effect is substantially lower if DEM_HETER and HIGH_QUAL assume very high values. 
Instead, the interaction effects in which either low HIGH_QUAL with high DEM_HETER, or 
HIGH HIGH_QUAL and low DEM_HETER are combined constitute intermediate cases. This 
triple interaction is statistically significant, further confirming that DEM_HETER and 
HIGH_QUAL play a very important role in modifying the negative effect of FTMT on 
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INN_PRO in family firms. Fig. 3 highlights that both HIGH_QUAL and DEM_HETER 
moderate the effect of FTMT on INN_PRO, however, high DEM_HETER has a stronger 
moderating effect than high HIGH_QUAL (the slope in Fig. 3 is less steep for the high 
DEM_HETER-low HIGH_QUAL combination).2 
(Insert Fig. 3 about here) 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper, we have analyzed the effect of DP and TP innovation impulses on the 
relationship between family management and innovation investment propensity. Drawing on 
the different characteristics associated with these two innovation impulses (as summarized in 
Table 1), we theorize their distinctive direct influence on family firms’ propensity to invest in 
innovation, and their distinctive indirect effect on the relationship between family management 
and innovation investment propensity. 
Consistent with prior studies (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Matzler et al., 2015; Sciascia et al., 
2015), our results show a negative effect of family management on innovation propensity, 
thereby supporting H1. This reinforces the idea that family management leads to a lower 
propensity to invest in innovation due to increasing risk aversion and focusing on protecting 
the family’s socioemotional wealth (Dièguez-Soto et al., 2016; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). 
Our analysis of the direct effects of the DP and TP innovation impulses adds new insights 
to the debate on the factors that can drive or inhibit family firms’ innovation investment 
propensity. Our hypotheses have been partially confirmed. Specifically, our expectation of the 
main effect of the DP impulse is confirmed (H2), highlighting that family firms’ innovation 
investment propensity increases when innovation decisions are pulled by the market demand 
impulse. This suggests that the characteristics of the DP innovation impulse (see Table 1) are 
relevant for the innovation investment decisions of family firms, as they support: a) the specific 
                                                 
2 The results from the robustness checks have been omitted for reasons of space, but are available upon request. 
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financial logic adopted by family firms (Gallo et al., 2004); b) their reluctance to invest 
extensive resources in R&D (Duran et al., 2016); and c) their risk aversion (Zahra, 2005).  
Thus, our results provide clear evidence of the close link between these three specific family 
firm characteristics and their preference for demand-pulled innovation, as has indirectly 
emerged in recent studies. For example, De Massis et al. (2015), in their exploratory analysis 
based on a multiple case study, show that family firms: prefer innovation investments with a 
low level of market uncertainty (firm C interview in Appendix A of their study, p. 28); take 
innovation decisions with the intention of avoiding the excessive consumption of family 
resources (firm D interview in Appendix A of their study, p. 28); and prefer demand-pulled 
innovation projects (firms A, B, C, and E interviews in Appendix 1 of their study, pp. 22–23).  
On the other hand, our hypothesis (H3) on the negative association between the TP 
innovation impulse and innovation investment propensity of family firms is not supported, as 
the result is not statistically significant. This “nonresult” (Bettis, Gambardella, Helfat, & 
Mitchell, 2014) suggests that the relationship is more complex than hypothesized. Indeed, other 
arguments in a positive direction may explain the main effect of the TP innovation impulse. 
For example, the long-term orientation of family ownership (Zellweger, 2007) and family 
members in the TMT (Hoffmann, Wulf, & Stubner, 2016) can increase the propensity to invest 
in long-term R&D activities (implying greater risk) (Sciascia et al., 2015), and their “patient 
capital” (Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011) can sustain investments in R&D activities with long-term 
benefits (Schmid, Achleitner, Ampenberger, & Kaserer, 2014). All these aspects are consistent 
with the technology-pushed innovation characteristics. Consequently, the direction of the main 
effect of the TP innovation impulse on family firm propensity to invest in innovation may be 
influenced by other contingent factors not considered in this study, providing an area ripe for 
future research. 
Our hypothesis on the moderating role of the DP and TP innovation impulses (H4 and H5) 
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are also partially confirmed, allowing us to better understand how these two impulses affect 
family firms’ innovation propensity. Specifically, Figs. 2 and 3 show that an increase in both 
the DP and TP innovation impulses leads to a weaker negative effect of family management 
on family firms’ propensity to invest in innovation, confirming H4 but not H5. This result 
affirms that the characteristics of the DP innovation impulse support the family management 
risk orientation and the focus on financial and non-financial goals. Conversely, in our 
hypothesis development, we argued that the TP innovation impulse has characteristics that can 
reinforce the negative effect of family management on innovation investment propensity, but 
our results show the opposite effect. Thus, the relationship proposed in H5 is statistically 
significant but with the opposite sign. This result may be explained by the argument that the 
main positive effect of TP is reinforced in the case of family members involved in management. 
In fact, family managers have longer investment horizons (compared to external managers), do 
not face strong pressure on short-term results, and their behavior is not focused on maximizing 
their reputation (Schmid et al., 2014). Therefore, family managers may be inclined to invest in 
innovation activities characterized by long-term duration, high risk, uncertainty, and long-term 
returns (such as technology-pushed innovation). From this point of view, our results seem to 
suggest that in family firms characterized by family management, the long-term orientation has 
a greater weight on the propensity to invest in innovation than the risk aversion that prior 
research shows (e.g., Schmid et al., 2014). 
Moreover, if we jointly consider the H3 “nonresult” and the H5 result, our study would seem 
to suggest that the TP innovation impulse is insufficient by itself to affect innovation 
investment propensity in family managed firms; instead, it is able to do so only in its interaction 
effect with family management. This interaction explanation contributes to advancing our 
understanding of the mechanisms behind the effect of family management, but future research 
is needed to assess whether our predictions hold. Comparing the effect of the DP and TP 
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innovation impulses, Fig. 3 highlights that the negative effect of family management on 
innovation investment propensity is weaker in the case of a high DP innovation impulse, 
suggesting that the DP innovation impulse is a key factor shaping the innovation propensity of 
family firms, and confirming that family firms’ innovation investments are more sensitive to 
demand-pull impulses.  
Our findings can be better interpreted if we consider the time window covered, namely 
2008–2009, a period marked by the start of the global financial crisis. Our results suggest that 
despite the effects of the crisis (in its early years), most Italian family SMEs reacted by 
continuing to invest in innovation, and during the crisis were particularly sensitive to demand-
pull impulses (less so to technology-push impulses).  
This interpretation is supported by the European Commission (2009) survey on the effects 
of the crisis on the innovation of European firms. Specifically, the survey reveals that in the 
transition from the pre-crisis to the crisis period (2006 to 2009), some countries reduced their 
investments in innovation less than others and/or kept the level of investments in innovation 
constant (e.g., Germany and Italy). Furthermore, more than half the companies considered that 
the demand-side policies positively affected their innovation activities in this period, 
particularly DP impulses, such as increased demand from existing commercial clients, and new 
opportunities to expand existing or new markets. Our study suggests that in the specific context 
of family firms, this innovative behavior is related to two factors: the tendency of family firms 
to prefer self-financing to loan capital (access to which is even more difficult during a crisis), 
and their preference for innovation projects of shorter duration, certain market demand, and 
therefore less risky (particularly important in periods of uncertainty). Thus, our results offer a 
significant contribution to understanding innovation investment decisions in the specific 
context of Italian family firms during the global crisis. 
These overall results offer several contributions to the literature on the innovation behavior 
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of family firms, and generally innovation management studies. First, this study enriches 
existing knowledge on the effect of family management on innovation inputs in family firms, 
suggesting that the propensity to invest in innovation is the result of a joint action between 
family management and the specific innovation impulse. Our findings contribute to 
determining whether and how different innovation impulses lead to a more or less negative 
effect of family management on family firms’ innovation investment propensity. Moreover, 
we shed light on which factors moderate the negative effect of family management on the 
innovation investment propensity of family firms. In fact, prior studies mostly focus on the 
direct effect of family management on innovation inputs, with consensus on the existence of a 
negative effect (Block, 2012; Kotlar et al., 2013). Building on this, the analysis of which factors 
moderate the negative effect of family management on innovation inputs allow us to better 
understand the heterogeneity among family firms and the differences in relation to non-family 
firms. Second, recent studies point out the existence of a knowledge gap at the intersection of 
the innovation management and family firm fields of study (Chrisman et al., 2015; De Massis 
et al., 2013). Our paper contributes to filling this gap by applying the demand-pull and 
technology-push theoretical framework developed in the context of family business 
organizations. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that considers the 
effect of the DP and TP innovation impulses to examine the innovation behavior of family 
firms and identify which factors may drive or inhibit their propensity to invest in innovation. 
Moreover, in the field of empirical studies on family business innovation, another element that 
distinguishes our study from prior research is the adoption of a direct measure of the propensity 
to invest in innovation instead of using R&D expenditure (or intensity) as a proxy. This 
measure provides a more accurate assessment of family firms’ propensity to invest in 
innovation, thus overcoming the limitations related to the use of R&D expenditure, which is 
usually underestimated in small firms (Archibugi & Pianta, 1996; Patel & Pavitt, 1995), and 
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higher for innovation projects that are technology-pushed (see Table 1).  
Furthermore, our study offers two main contributions to the innovation management 
literature. First, it highlights that the demand-pull and technology-push theoretical framework 
is also useful to explain the innovation behavior of family firms and specifically that market 
heterogeneity and highly qualified employees are able to affect the innovation behavior of 
family firms. Moreover, our results contribute to the debate on the juxtaposition between 
technology and demand as sources of innovation and/or their complementary role (Di Stefano 
et al., 2012), showing that both the DP and TP impulses can affect family firm innovation 
behavior, but the DP innovation impulse has a stronger influence on innovation investments. 
This suggests that the role and effect of these two innovation impulses also depend on the 
firm’s specific nature and characteristics. Second, our study highlights that in family firms, the 
DP and TP innovation impulses exert their indirect effect by reducing the negative effect of 
family management on innovation investment propensity. Thus, we contribute to filling the 
gap in knowledge on the mechanisms with which firms can effectively exploit the effects of 
the DP and TP innovation impulses (Di Stefano et al., 2012). In particular, our results suggest 
that in the specific field of family business, the DP innovation impulse is able to positively 
influence the propensity to invest in innovation because it reduces the negative effect of FTMT. 
Therefore, family owned-managed firms can effectively exploit the effect of the DP innovation 
impulse through the relationship between FTMT and the propensity to invest in innovation. 
 
6. Implications, limitations, and future research 
Our results have implications for managers, practitioners advising family firms, and 
policymakers. First, the study cautions family business owners and managers to consider that 
the DP and TP innovation impulses may have different strengths in shaping their firm’s 
propensity to invest in innovation. Specifically, our results show that the innovation demand-
pull impulse can significantly reduce the negative effect of family involvement in the TMT on 
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the propensity to invest in innovation. This result may have important implications considering 
that: 1) the TMT is considered the most adept at defining and influencing strategic decisions; 
and 2) in family businesses, when family members are involved in the TMT, the FTMT 
decision-making process is the result of a complex dynamic of interacting and balancing the 
interests of the family component of the TMT with the non-family component (e.g., Binacci, 
Peruffo, Oriani, & Minichilli, 2016; Vandekerkhof, Steijvers, Hendriks, & Voordeckers, 2019). 
In fact, family managers usually also focus on socio-emotional and control objectives that can 
generate strategic inertia and limit innovation investments.  
On the other hand, non-family managers strongly focus on financial goals, are less risk 
averse, and emotionally distant from the family system (e.g., Binacci et al., 2016). Therefore, 
managers need to consider that innovation budgets and plans based on the DP impulse can 
contribute to aligning and balancing the interests of family and non-family members of the 
TMT with regard to innovation investment decisions. As the characteristics of the DP 
innovation impulse fit better with the family members’ SEW and control objectives, managers 
should create an appropriate process to support the DP impulse, exploit the demand-side 
policies promoted by policymakers, and strengthen the management team’s DP approach.  
This study provides a first step in guiding managers in this respect, suggesting the need to 
examine the extent to which DP and TP impulses can affect innovation in family firms. 
Our results also have implications for practitioners advising family firms who need to 
carefully evaluate all the aspects described when providing innovation investment advice. 
Moreover, given that innovation is a key driver of technological progress and economic 
growth, our study also has implications for policymakers. Our findings could help them decide 
under what circumstances the innovation investments of firms with family management should 
be promoted through DP or TP policies. In particular, policymakers can encourage innovation 
efforts by reducing the private cost of producing innovation (TP policy) or increasing the 
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private payoff from successful innovation (DP policy) (Nemet, 2009). Given our results, 
policymakers should consider that the DP innovation impulse has a greater ability to stimulate 
the innovation propensity of family SMEs (compared to the TP impulse). 
Specifically, the measures through which policymakers can expand the heterogeneity of 
markets (and therefore demand) can be direct and/or indirect. In terms of direct measures, 
policymakers might promote foreign commercial credit, enabling firms to offer customers 
competitive payment extensions or granting subsidized loans to SMEs for the promotion of 
products in foreign markets (through opening showrooms, stores, or participating in fairs or 
exhibitions), thereby stimulating foreign demand.  
In terms of indirect measures, policymakers might refer to various financial incentives (e.g., 
investments and/or factual project studies) offered to firms that intend to develop their trade in 
foreign markets. Although our findings suggest that the TP impulse is less decisive than the 
DP impulse, support policies might involve the development of high-level training programs 
and staff qualifications in SMEs, as well as their direct involvement in developing such training 
programs (European Commission, 2015). 
Our research might therefore assist policymakers in defining effective policies to support 
innovation in family firms and allocating public resources to DP versus TP activities.  
This paper is not without limitations, which also offer opportunities for future research. 
First, our investigation focuses on Italian family firms. To increase the external validity of our 
results, future studies could consider different countries. Indeed, the literature suggests that 
innovation management processes may be affected by cultural contingencies (Hayton, George, 
& Zahra, 2002). Secondly, although we controlled for potential endogeneity issues, we adopted 
a cross-sectional analysis given that our dataset covers the period 2007–2009. A longitudinal 
analysis could provide further evidence on causality directions among the variables, and 
thereby increase the validity of our results. Third, we measured the DP and TP variables 
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following some prior studies developed in the mainstream innovation literature. Future 
research could employ further measures for the DP and TP innovation impulses to check 
whether our results hold. Indeed, prior studies suggest other possible measures for the DP 
innovation impulse, such as heterogeneity in consumer needs and requirements (Adner & 
Levinthal, 2001), potential new markets (Vernon, 1966), and for the TP innovation impulse, 
employee further education (Horbach, 2008), firm-specific technological competences, and 
R&D cost structure (Lee, 2003). This aspect assumes particular relevance for the TP variable, 
in light of the unexpected result of its moderating effect on the propensity to invest in 
innovation, as discussed in the previous section. Surely, this result is worth of investigation in 
future theoretical and empirical research in order to verify if there is an underlying theoretical 
explanation for it (i.e. how and why the high level of high qualification of employees reduces 
the negative effect exerted by family management on the propensity to invest in innovation) or 
if, instead, the measurement of the TP variable needs to be refined to fully understand its effect 
on the relationship between family management and firm propensity to invest in innovation. 
Another limitation of our study is the selection of the sample and the family business 
definition adopted. As known, there is no consensus on the definition of a family business in 
the literature (see De Massis et al. (2012) for a recent overview). Certainly, an analysis of how 
our results might differ when changing the definition of family firms would enrich studies on 
their behavior. Finally, we focus on family SMEs. Future research could analyze the proposed 
research model in the context of large family firms to verify whether family firms of different 
sizes behave differently or not. Indeed, large firms may have different risk perceptions, 
resource endowments, access to resources, and degree of accumulated knowledge. Moreover, 
family firms differ in the extent to which they pay attention to their past and tradition (De 
Massis, Frattini, Kotlar, Petruzzelli, & Wright, 2016a), and the role of innovation impulses in 
investment decisions may also vary, for instance, between multigenerational family firms that 
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have a long tradition and first generation firms. Accordingly, future scholars could investigate 
this topic by distinguishing family firms of different generations. 
In conclusion, our study offers theoretical arguments and empirical support for how the 
different innovation impulses influence the innovation investment propensity of family firms, 
paving the way for future research on this interesting topic. 
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Fig. 2. Moderation effect of demand heterogeneity (DEM_HETER) and high qualification of employees 
(HIGH_QUAL) on the relation between family management (FTMT) and innovation investment propensity 
(INN_PRO), separately for each moderator. 
  
H1 (-) Propensity to invest  in innovation 
(INN_PRO) 


















Fig. 3. Moderation effect of demand heterogeneity (DEM_HETER) and high qualification of employees 





Table 1   
Summary of the differences between the DP and TP innovation impulses  
 
Attribute Demand-pull Technology-push Selected references 
Technological uncertainty Low High  
Brem and Voigt (2009); 
Gerpott (2005); 
Hersatt and Lettl (2004); 
Sarja (2015) 
 
R&D expenditure Low High 
R&D duration Short Long 
Sales-market related uncertainty Low High 
Time-to-market Certain/Known Uncertain/ 
unknown 
R&D customer integration Easy Difficult 




The need to change customer behavior Minimal Extensive 
Relevance of the firm’s knowledge capital 
stock  
Low High Horbach (2008); 
García-Quevedo et al. 
(2014); Nemet (2009); 
Rosenberg (1990) 
Relevance of the firm’s absorptive capacity  Low High 










Table 2   
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables mean sd median min max 
INN_PRO 0.45* 
 
0 0 1 
AGE   3 1 3 
SECTOR 







1 0 1 
CEO_AGE 
  
5 1 7 
EMPL 32.32 23.51 25 10 154 
FTMT 84.48 24.23 100 14.29 100 
DEM_HETER 6.88 9.84 3 0 85 
HIGH_QUAL 7.03 10.27 4.55 0 100 
Note: N=1093. “*”percentage of cases. 
 
 
Table 3   
Correlation Matrix 
 
  INN_PRO AGE PUB FAM_CEO CEO_AGE EMPL FTMT DEM_HETER 
INN_PRO          
AGE 0.11***         
PUB 0.05 -0.03        
FAM_CEO -0.06* 0.04 0.00       
CEO_AGE 0.11*** 0.17*** -0.03 0.02      
EMPL 0.10** 0.14*** 0.05 -0.04 0.06     
FTMT -0.27*** -0.07* -0.06 0.15*** -0.03 -0.23***    
DEM_HETER 0.12*** 0.10** 0.07* -0.04 0.09** 0.24*** -0.13***   
HIGH_QUAL 0.10*** 0.03 0.13*** 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.17*** 0.18*** 






Table 4   
Logistic regression models 
 
    Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4 
    coeff std. Error   coeff 
std. 
Error   coeff 
std. 
Error   coeff 
std. 
Error 
(Intercept)   -1.1246 * 0.491   0.5466  0.551   0.4375  0.557   1.3799 * 0.620 
as.factor(AGE) 
as.factor(AGE)2   0.3375   0.312   0.3607   0.321   0.3800   0.323   0.3301   0.322 
as.factor(AGE)3   0.6650 * 0.303   0.6498 * 0.311   0.6444 * 0.313   0.6024   0.312 
as.factor(SECTOR) 
as.factor(SECTOR)2   0.1959   0.169   0.0814   0.175   0.0313   0.177   0.0361   0.178 
as.factor(SECTOR)3   0.1369   0.151   0.0588   0.155   0.0457   0.156   0.0546   0.158 
as.factor(SECTOR)4   0.7725 * 0.358   0.4619   0.368   0.2946   0.377   0.2759   0.375 
PUB   0.2791   0.167   0.2329   0.172   0.1864   0.174   0.1781   0.175 
FAM_CEO   -0.7097 * 0.347   -0.3775   0.363   -0.3760   0.366   -0.4059   0.365 
CEO_AGE   0.1597 ** 0.053   0.1631 ** 0.055   0.1543 ** 0.055   0.1442 ** 0.056 
EMPL   0.0063 * 0.003   0.0019   0.003   0.0008   0.003   0.0014   0.003 
FTMT           -0.0213 *** 0.003   
-
0.0207 *** 0.003   
-
0.0305 *** 0.004 
DEM_HETER                   0.0138 * 0.007   -0.0448 * 0.023 
HIGH_QUAL                   0.0078   0.007   -0.0288   0.019 
FTMT:DEM_HETER                           0.0007 ** 0.000 
FTMT:HIGH_QUAL                           0.0005 * 0.000 
Observations   1093   1093   1093   1093 
AIC   1480.869   1422.618   1420.418   1412.326 
-2 Log-Likelihood   1460.869   1400.618   1394.418   1382.326 
Χ2deviance   p=.000   p=.000   p=.000   p=.000 
Hosmer-Lemeshow-Χ2   9.755; p=.283   7.641; p=.469   14.970; p=.060   4.631; p=.796 
Notes:* p<.05,  **p<.01 ,  *** p<.001 
 
